coreutils: shred invocation

 
 11.6 ‘shred’: Remove files more securely
 ========================================
 
 ‘shred’ overwrites devices or files, to help prevent even extensive
 forensics from recovering the data.
 
    Ordinarily when you remove a file (⇒rm invocation), its data
 and metadata are not actually destroyed.  Only the file’s directory
 entry is removed, and the file’s storage is reclaimed only when no
 process has the file open and no other directory entry links to the
 file.  And even if file’s data and metadata’s storage space is freed for
 further reuse, there are undelete utilities that will attempt to
 reconstruct the file from the data in freed storage, and that can bring
 the file back if the storage was not rewritten.
 
    On a busy system with a nearly-full device, space can get reused in a
 few seconds.  But there is no way to know for sure.  And although the
 undelete utilities and already-existing processes require insider or
 superuser access, you may be wary of the superuser, of processes running
 on your behalf, or of attackers that can physically access the storage
 device.  So if you have sensitive data, you may want to be sure that
 recovery is not possible by plausible attacks like these.
 
    The best way to remove something irretrievably is to destroy the
 media it’s on with acid, melt it down, or the like.  For cheap removable
 media this is often the preferred method.  However, some storage devices
 are expensive or are harder to destroy, so the ‘shred’ utility tries to
 achieve a similar effect non-destructively, by overwriting the file with
 non-sensitive data.
 
    *Please note* that ‘shred’ relies on a crucial assumption: that the
 file system and hardware overwrite data in place.  Although this is
 common and is the traditional way to do things, but many modern file
 system designs do not satisfy this assumption.  Exceptions include:
 
    • Log-structured or journaled file systems, such as ext3/ext4 (in
      ‘data=journal’ mode), Btrfs, NTFS, ReiserFS, XFS, ZFS, file systems
      supplied with AIX and Solaris, etc., when they are configured to
      journal data.
 
    • File systems that write redundant data and carry on even if some
      writes fail, such as RAID-based file systems.
 
    • File systems that make snapshots, such as Network Appliance’s NFS
      server.
 
    • File systems that cache in temporary locations, such as NFS version
      3 clients.
 
    • Compressed file systems.
 
    For ext3 and ext4 file systems, ‘shred’ is less effective when the
 file system is in ‘data=journal’ mode, which journals file data in
 addition to just metadata.  In both the ‘data=ordered’ (default) and
 ‘data=writeback’ modes, ‘shred’ works as usual.  The ext3/ext4
 journaling modes can be changed by adding the ‘data=something’ option to
 the mount options for a particular file system in the ‘/etc/fstab’ file,
 as documented in the ‘mount’ man page (‘man mount’).  Alternatively, if
 you know how large the journal is, you can shred the journal by
 shredding enough file data so that the journal cycles around and fills
 up with shredded data.
 
    If you are not sure how your file system operates, then you should
 assume that it does not overwrite data in place, which means ‘shred’
 cannot reliably operate on regular files in your file system.
 
    Generally speaking, it is more reliable to shred a device than a
 file, since this bypasses file system design issues mentioned above.
 However, devices are also problematic for shredding, for reasons such as
 the following:
 
    • Solid-state storage devices (SSDs) typically do wear leveling to
      prolong service life, and this means writes are distributed to
      other blocks by the hardware, so “overwritten” data blocks are
      still present in the underlying device.
 
    • Most storage devices map out bad blocks invisibly to the
      application; if the bad blocks contain sensitive data, ‘shred’
      won’t be able to destroy it.
 
    • With some obsolete storage technologies, it may be possible to take
      (say) a floppy disk back to a laboratory and use a lot of sensitive
      (and expensive) equipment to look for the faint “echoes” of the
      original data underneath the overwritten data.  With these older
      technologies, if the file has been overwritten only once, it’s
      reputedly not even that hard.  Luckily, this kind of data recovery
      has become difficult, and there is no public evidence that today’s
      higher-density storage devices can be analyzed in this way.
 
      The ‘shred’ command can use many overwrite passes, with data
      patterns chosen to maximize the damage they do to the old data.  By
      default the patterns are designed for best effect on hard drives
      using now-obsolete technology; for newer devices, a single pass
      should suffice.  For more details, see the source code and Peter
      Gutmann’s paper ‘Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and
      Solid-State Memory’
      (https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/secure_del.html), from
      the proceedings of the Sixth USENIX Security Symposium (San Jose,
      California, July 22–25, 1996).
 
    ‘shred’ makes no attempt to detect or report these problems, just as
 it makes no attempt to do anything about backups.  However, since it is
 more reliable to shred devices than files, ‘shred’ by default does not
 deallocate or remove the output file.  This default is more suitable for
 devices, which typically cannot be deallocated and should not be
 removed.
 
    Finally, consider the risk of backups and mirrors.  File system
 backups and remote mirrors may contain copies of the file that cannot be
 removed, and that will allow a shredded file to be recovered later.  So
 if you keep any data you may later want to destroy using ‘shred’, be
 sure that it is not backed up or mirrored.
 
      shred [OPTION]... FILE[...]
 
    The program accepts the following options.  Also see ⇒Common
 options.
 
 ‘-f’
 ‘--force’
      Override file permissions if necessary to allow overwriting.
 
 ‘-n NUMBER’
 ‘--iterations=NUMBER’
      By default, ‘shred’ uses 3 passes of overwrite.  You can reduce
      this to save time, or increase it if you think it’s appropriate.
      After 25 passes all of the internal overwrite patterns will have
      been used at least once.
 
 ‘--random-source=FILE’
      Use FILE as a source of random data used to overwrite and to choose
      pass ordering.  ⇒Random sources.
 
 ‘-s BYTES’
 ‘--size=BYTES’
      Shred the first BYTES bytes of the file.  The default is to shred
      the whole file.  BYTES can be followed by a size specification like
      ‘K’, ‘M’, or ‘G’ to specify a multiple.  ⇒Block size.
 
 ‘-u’
 ‘--remove[=HOW]’
      After shredding a file, deallocate it (if possible) and then remove
      it.  If a file has multiple links, only the named links will be
      removed.  Often the file name is less sensitive than the file data,
      in which case the optional HOW parameter, supported with the long
      form option, gives control of how to more efficiently remove each
      directory entry.  The ‘unlink’ parameter will just use a standard
      unlink call, ‘wipe’ will also first obfuscate bytes in the name,
      and ‘wipesync’ will also sync each obfuscated byte in the name to
      disk.  Note ‘wipesync’ is the default method, but can be expensive,
      requiring a sync for every character in every file.  This can
      become significant with many files, or is redundant if your file
      system provides synchronous metadata updates.
 
 ‘-v’
 ‘--verbose’
      Display to standard error all status updates as sterilization
      proceeds.
 
 ‘-x’
 ‘--exact’
      By default, ‘shred’ rounds the size of a regular file up to the
      next multiple of the file system block size to fully erase the
      slack space in the last block of the file.  This space may contain
      portions of the current system memory on some systems for example.
      Use ‘--exact’ to suppress that behavior.  Thus, by default if you
      shred a 10-byte regular file on a system with 512-byte blocks, the
      resulting file will be 512 bytes long.  With this option, shred
      does not increase the apparent size of the file.
 
 ‘-z’
 ‘--zero’
      Normally, the last pass that ‘shred’ writes is made up of random
      data.  If this would be conspicuous on your storage device (for
      example, because it looks like encrypted data), or you just think
      it’s tidier, the ‘--zero’ option adds an additional overwrite pass
      with all zero bits.  This is in addition to the number of passes
      specified by the ‘--iterations’ option.
 
    You might use the following command to erase the file system you
 created on a USB flash drive.  This command typically takes several
 minutes, depending on the drive’s size and write speed.  On modern
 storage devices a single pass should be adequate, and will take one
 third the time of the default three-pass approach.
 
      shred -v -n 1 /dev/sdd1
 
    Similarly, to erase all data on a selected partition of your hard
 disk, you could give a command like the following.
 
      # 1 pass, write pseudo-random data; 3x faster than the default
      shred -v -n1 /dev/sda5
 
    To be on the safe side, use at least one pass that overwrites using
 pseudo-random data.  I.e., don’t be tempted to use ‘-n0 --zero’, in case
 some disk controller optimizes the process of writing blocks of all
 zeros, and thereby does not clear all bytes in a block.  Some SSDs may
 do just that.
 
    A FILE of ‘-’ denotes standard output.  The intended use of this is
 to shred a removed temporary file.  For example:
 
      i=$(mktemp)
      exec 3<>"$i"
      rm -- "$i"
      echo "Hello, world" >&3
      shred - >&3
      exec 3>-
 
    However, the command ‘shred - >file’ does not shred the contents of
 FILE, since the shell truncates FILE before invoking ‘shred’.  Use the
 command ‘shred file’ or (if using a Bourne-compatible shell) the command
 ‘shred - 1<>file’ instead.
 
    An exit status of zero indicates success, and a nonzero value
 indicates failure.